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Abstract 
Information is a key concept in evolutionary biology. Information is stored in biological 
organism’s genomes, and used to generate the organism as well as to maintain and 
control it. Information is also “that which evolves”. When a population adapts to a local 
environment, information about this environment is fixed in a representative genome. 
However, when an environment changes, information can be lost. At the same time, 
information is processed by animal brains to survive in complex environments, and the 
capacity for information processing also evolves. Here I review applications of 
information theory to the evolution of proteins as well as to the evolution of information 
processing in simulated agents that adapt to perform a complex task. 
1. Introduction 
Evolutionary biology has traditionally been a science that used observation and the 
analysis of specimens to draw inferences about common descent, adaptation, variation, 
and selection1,2. In contrast to this discipline that requires fieldwork and meticulous 
attention to detail stands the mathematical theory of population genetics3,4, which 
developed in parallel but somewhat removed from evolutionary biology, as it could treat 
exactly only very abstract cases. The mathematical theory cast Darwin’s insight about 
inheritance, variation, and selection into formulae that could predict particular aspects of 
the evolutionary process, such as the probability that an allele that conferred a particular 
advantage would go to fixation, how long this process would take, and how it would be 
modified by different forms of inheritance. Missing from these two disciplines, however, 
was a framework that would allow us to understand the broad macro-evolutionary arcs 
that we can see everywhere in the biosphere and in the fossil record: the lines of descent 
that connect simple to complex forms of life. Granted, the existence of these unbroken 
lines—and the fact that they are the result of the evolutionary mechanisms at work—is 
not in doubt. Yet, mathematical population genetics cannot quantify them because the 
theory only deals with existing variation. At the same time, the uniqueness of any 
particular line of descent appears to preclude a generative principle, or a framework that 
would allow us to understand the generation of these lines from a perspective once 
removed from the microscopic mechanisms that shape genes one mutation at the time. In 
the last 23 years or so, the situation has changed dramatically because of the advent of 
long-term evolution experiments with replicate lines of bacteria adapting for over 50,000 
generations5,6, as well as in-silico evolution experiments covering millions of 
generations7,8. Both experimental approaches, in their own way, have provided us with 
key insights into the evolution of complexity on macroscopic time scales6,8-14.  
But there is a common concept that unifies the digital and the biochemical approach: 
information. That information is the essence of “that which evolves” has been implicit in 
many writings (although the word “information” does not appear in Darwin’s On the 
Origin of Species). Indeed, shortly after the genesis of the theory of information at the 
hands of a Bell Laboratories engineer15, this theory was thought to explain everything 
from the higher functions of living organisms down to metabolism, growth, and 
differentiation16. However, this optimism soon gave way to a miasma of confounding 
mathematical and philosophical arguments that dampened enthusiasm for the concept of 
information in biology for decades. To some extent, evolutionary biology was not yet 
ready for a quantitative treatment of “that which evolves”: the year of publication of 
“Information in Biology”16 coincided with the discovery of the structure of DNA, and the 
wealth of sequence data that catapulted evolutionary biology into the computer age was 
still half-a-century away.   
Colloquially, information is often described as something that aids in decision-making. 
Interestingly, this is very close to the mathematical meaning of “information”, which is 
concerned with quantifying the ability to make predictions about uncertain systems. 
Life—among many other aspects—has the peculiar property of displaying behavior or 
characters that are appropriate, given the environment. We recognize this of course as the 
consequence of adaptation, but the outcome is that the adapted organism’s decisions are 
“in tune” with its environment: the organism has information about its environment. One 
of the insights that has emerged from the theory of computation is that information must 
be physical: information cannot exist without a physical substrate that encodes it17. In 
computers, information is encoded in zeros and ones, which themselves are represented 
by different voltages on semiconductors. The information we retain in our brains also has 
a physical substrate, even though its physiological basis depends on the type of memory 
and is far from certain. Context-appropriate decisions require information, however it is 
stored. For cells, we now know that this information is stored in a cell’s inherited genetic 
material, and is precisely the kind that Shannon described in his 1948 articles.  If 
inherited genetic material represents information, then how did the information-carrying 
molecules acquire it? Is the amount of information stored in genes increasing throughout 
evolution, and if so, why? How much information does an organism store? How much in 
a single gene? If we can replace a discussion of the evolution of complexity along the 
various lines of descent by a discussion of the evolution of information, perhaps then we 
can find those general principles that have eluded us so far.  
In this review, I focus on two uses of information theory in evolutionary biology: First, 
the quantification of the information content of genes and proteins and how this 
information may have evolved along the branches of the tree of life. Second, the 
evolution of information-processing structures (such as brains) that control animals, and 
how the functional complexity of these brains (and how they evolve) could be quantified 
using information theory. The latter approach reinforces a concept that has appeared in 
neuroscience repeatedly: the value of information for an adapted organism is fitness18, 
and the complexity of an organism’s brain must be reflected in how it manages to 
process, integrate, and make use of information for its own advantage19.  
2. Entropy and Information in Molecular Sequences 
To define entropy and information, we first must define the concept of a random 
variable. In probability theory, a random variable X is a mathematical object that can take 
on a finite number of different states   
  
x1xn  with specified probabilities   
  
p1,, pn .  We 
should keep in mind that a mathematical random variable is a description—sometimes 
accurate, sometimes not—of a physical object. For example, the random variable that we 
would use to describe a fair coin has two states: 
  
x1 = heads  and 
  
x2 = tails , with 
probabilities 
  
p1 = p2 = 0.5. Of course, an actual coin is a far more complex device: it may 
deviate from being true, it may land on an edge once in a while, and its faces can make 
different angles with true North. Yet, when coins are used for demonstrations in 
probability theory or statistics, they are most succinctly described with two states and two 
equal probabilities. Nucleic acids can be described probabilistically in a similar manner. 
We can define a nucleic acid random variable X as having four states 
  
x1 = A, x2 = C, x3 = G  and 
  
x4 = T which it can take on with probabilities   
  
p1,, p4 , while 
being perfectly aware that the nucleic acid molecules themselves are far more complex, 
and deserve a richer description than the four-state abstraction. But given the role that 
these molecules play as information carriers of the genetic material, this abstraction will 
serve us very well going forward.  
2.1 Entropy 
Using the concept of a random variable X, we can define its entropy (sometimes called 
uncertainty) as20,21 
  
H(X) = − pi log pi
i=1
n
∑  .   (1) 
Here, the logarithm is taken to an arbitrary base that will normalize (and give units to) the 
entropy. If we choose the dual logarithm, the units are “bits”, while if we choose base e, 
the units are “nats”. Here, I will often choose the size of the alphabet as the base of the 
logarithm, and call the unit the “mer”22. So, if we describe nucleic acid sequences 
(alphabet size 4), a single nucleotide can have up to one “mer” of entropy, while if we 
describe proteins (logarithms taken to the base 20), a single residue can have up to one 
mer of entropy. Naturally, a five-mer has up to 5 mers of entropy, and so on.  
A true coin, we can immediately convince ourselves, has an entropy of one bit. A single 
random nucleotide, by the same reasoning, has an entropy of one mer (or two bits) 
because  
  
H(X) = − 1/4 log1/4 = 1.
i=1`
4
∑    (2)  
What is the entropy of a non-random nucleotide? To determine this, we have to find the 
probabilities  with which that nucleotide is found at a particular position within a gene. 
Say we are interested in nucleotide 28 of the 76 base pair tRNA gene of the bacterium 
Escherichia coli. What is its entropy? To determine this, we need to obtain an estimate of 
the probability that any of the four nucleotides are found at that particular position. This 
kind of information can be gained from sequence repositories. For example, the database 
tRNAdb23 contains sequences for more than 12,000 tRNA genes. For the E. coli tRNA 
gene, among 33 verified sequences (for different anticodons), we find five that show ‘A’ 
at the 28th position, 17 have a ‘C’, 5 have a ‘G’, and 6 have a ‘T’. We can use these 
numbers to estimate the substitution probabilities at this position as 
  
p28(A) = 5/33, p28(C) =17/33, p28(G) = 5/33, p28(T) = 6/33,    (3) 
which, even though the statistics are not good, allow us to infer that ‘C’ is preferred at 
that position. The entropy of position variable 
  
X28  can now be estimated as 
  
H(X28) = −2 × 533 log2 533 − 1733 log2 1733 − 633 log2 633 ≈1.765 bits , (4) 
or less than the maximal 2 bits we would expect if all nucleotides appeared with equal 
probability. Such an uneven distribution of states immediately suggests a “betting” 
strategy that would allow us to make predictions with accuracy better than chance about 
the state of position variable 
  
X28 : If we bet that we would see a ‘C’ there, then we would 
be right over half the time on average, as opposed to a quarter of the time for a variable 
that is evenly distributed across the four states. In other words, information is stored in 
this variable. 
2.2 Information 
To learn how to quantify the amount of information stored, let us go through the same 
exercise for a different position (say, position 41a) of that molecule, to find approximately 
  
p41(A) = 0.24, p41(C) = 0.46, p41(G) = 0.21, p41(T) = 0.09  ,  (5) 
so that 
  
H(X41) ≈1.795bits. In order to determine how likely it is to find any particular 
nucleotide at position 41 given position 28 is a ‘C’, for example, we have to collect 
conditional probabilities. They are easily obtained if we know the joint probability to 
observe any of the 16 combinations AA…TT at the two positions. The conditional 
probability to observe state j at position 41 given state i at position 28 is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a The precise numbering of nucleotide positions differs between databases 
  
pi| j =
pij
p j
	  	  ,	   	   (6)	  
where
  
pij  is the joint probability to observe state i at position 28 and at the same time state 
j at position 41 and the notation “i|j” is read as “i given j”. Collecting these probabilities 
from the sequence data gives the probability matrix that relates the random variable 
  
X28  
to the variable 
  
X41 
	  .	  
(7)	  
We can glean important information from these probabilities. It is clear, for example, that 
positions 28 and 41 are not independent from each other. If nucleotide 28 is an ‘A’, then 
position 41 can only be an ‘A’ or a ‘G’, but mostly (4/5 times) you expect a ‘G’. But 
consider the dependence between nucleotides 42 and 28:  
                                      .  (8) 
This dependence is striking: if you know position 28, you can predict (based on the 
sequence data given) position 42 with certainty. The reason for this perfect correlation 
lies in the functional interaction between the sites: 28 and 42 are paired in a stem of the 
tRNA molecule in a Watson-Crick pair: to enable the pairing, a ‘G’ must be associated 
with a ‘C’, and a ‘T’ must be associated with an ‘A’. It does not matter which is at any 
position as long as the paired nucleotide is complementary. And it is also clear that these 
associations are maintained by the selective pressures of Darwinian evolution: a 
substitution that breaks the pattern leads to a molecule that does not fold into the correct 
shape to efficiently translate messenger RNA into proteins. As a consequence, the 
organism bearing such a mutation will be eliminated from the gene pool. This simple 
example shows clearly the relationship between information theory and evolutionary 
biology: fitness is reflected in information, and when selective pressures maximize 
fitness, information must be maximized concurrently. We can now proceed and calculate 
the information content.  
Each column in Eq. (7) represents a conditional probability to find a particular nucleotide 
at position 41 given a particular value is found at position 28. We can use these values to 
calculate the conditional entropy to find a particular nucleotide, given that position 28 is 
‘A’, for example, as 
  
H(X41 | X28 = A) = −0.2log2 0.2 − 0.8log2 0.8 ≈ 0.72 	  bits	  	  .	  	  	  	  	  	  (9)	  
This allows us to calculate the amount of information that is revealed (about ) by 
knowing the state of . If we do not know the state of , our uncertainty about  
is 1.795 bits, as calculated above. But revealing that  actually is an ‘A’ has reduced 
our uncertainty to 0.72 bits, as we saw in Eq. (9). The information we obtained is then 
just the difference: 
  
I(X41 : X28 = A) = H(X41) − H(X41 | X28 = A) ≈1.075 bits  ,  (10) 
that is, just over one bit. The notation in Eq. (10), indicating information between two 
variables by a colon (sometimes a semi-colon) is conventional. We can also calculate the 
average amount of information about 
  
X41 that is gained by revealing the state of 
  
X28  as 
  
I(X41 : X28) = H(X41) − H(X41 | X28) ≈ 0.64 bits	  	  	  .	   	   (11) 
Here, 
  
H(X41 | X28)  is the average conditional entropy of 
  
X41 given 
  
X28 , obtained by 
averaging the four conditional entropies (for the four possible states of 
  
X28 ) using the 
probabilities with which 
  
X28  occurs in any of its four states, given by Eq. (3). If we apply 
the same calculation to the pair of positions 
  
X42  and 
  
X28 , we should find that knowing 
  
X28  reduces our uncertainty about 
  
X42  to zero: indeed, 
  
X28  carries perfect information 
about 
  
X42 . The covariance between residues in an RNA secondary structure captured by 
the mutual entropy can be used to predict secondary structure from sequence alignments 
alone24.  
2.3 Information Content of Proteins 
We have seen that different positions within a biomolecule can carry information about 
other positions, but how much information do they store about the environment within 
which they evolve? This question can be answered using the same information-theoretic 
formalism introduced above. Information is defined as a reduction in our uncertainty 
(caused by our ability to make predictions with an accuracy better than chance) when 
armed with information. Here we will use proteins as our biomolecules, which means our 
random variables can take on 20 states, and our protein variable will be given by the joint 
variable  
  
  
X = X1X2XL 	  ,	   	   (12) 
where L is the number of residues in the protein. We now ask: “How much information 
about the environment (rather than about another residue) is stored in a particular 
residue?” To answer this, we have to first calculate the uncertainty about any particular 
residue in the absence of information about the environment. Clearly, it is the 
environment within which a protein finds itself that constrains the particular amino acids 
that a position variable can take on. If I do not specify this environment, there is nothing 
that constrains any particular residue i, and as a consequence the entropy is maximal: 
  
H(Xi) = Hmax = log2 20 ≈ 4.32 bits   . (13) 
In any functional protein, the residue is highly constrained, however. Let us imagine that 
the possible states of the environment can be described by a random variable E (that takes 
on specific environmental states 
  
e j  with given probabilities). Then the information about 
environment 
  
E = e j  contained in position variable 
  
Xi  of protein X is given by 
  
I(Xi : E = e j ) = Hmax − H(Xi | E = e j )   ,    (14) 
in perfect analogy to Eq. (10). How do we calculate the information content of the entire 
protein, armed only with the information content of residues? If residues do not interact 
(that is, the state of a residue at one position does not reveal any information about the 
state of a residue at another position), then the information content of the protein would 
just be a sum of the information content of each residue: 
  
I(X : E = e j ) = I(Xi : E = e j )
i=1
L
∑   . (15) 
This independence of positions certainly could not be assumed in RNA molecules that 
rely on Watson-Crick binding to establish their secondary structure. In proteins, 
correlation between residues are much weaker (but certainly still important, see, e.g.25-
33.), and we can take Eq. (15) as a first-order approximation of the information content, 
while keeping in mind that residue-residue correlations encode important information 
about the stability of the protein and its functional affinity to other molecules. Note, 
however, that a population with two or more subdivisions, where each subpopulation has 
different amino acid frequencies, can mimic residue correlations on the level of the whole 
population when there are none on the level of the subpopulations34.  
For most cases that we will have to deal with, a protein is only functional in a very 
defined cellular environment, and as a consequence the conditional entropy of a residue is 
fixed by the substitution probabilities that we can observe.  Let us take as an example the 
rodent homeodomain protein35, defined by 57 residues. The environment for this protein 
is of course the rodent, and we might surmise that the information content of the 
homeodomain protein in rodents is different from the homeodomain protein in primates, 
for example, simply because primates and rodents have diverged about 100 million years 
ago36, and have since taken independent evolutionary paths. We can test this hypothesis 
by calculating the information content of rodent proteins and compare it to the primate 
version, using substitution probabilities inferred from sequence data that can be found, 
for example, in the Pfam database37. Let us first look at the entropy per residue, along the 
chain length of the 57-mer. But instead of calculating the entropy in bits (by taking the 
base-2 logarithm), we will calculate the entropy in “mers”, by taking the logarithm to 
base 20. This way, a single residue can have at most 1 mer of entropy, and the 57-mer has 
at most 57 mers of entropy. The entropic profile (entropy per site as a function of site) of 
the rodent homeodomain protein depicted in Figure 1 shows that the entropy varies 
considerably from site to site, with strongly conserved as well as highly variable residues. 
 
 FIG 1: Entropic profile of the 57 amino acid rodent homeodomain, obtained from 810 sequences 
in Pfam (accessed February 3rd, 2011). Error of the mean is smaller than the data points shown. 
Residues are numbered 2-58 as is common for this domain35.  
When estimating entropies from finite ensembles (small number of sequences), care must 
be taken to correct for the bias that is inherent in estimating the probabilities from the 
frequencies. Rare sequences will be assigned zero probabilities in small ensembles but 
not in larger ones. Because this error is not symmetric (probabilities will always be 
underestimated), the bias is always towards smaller entropies. Several methods can be 
applied to correct for this, and I have used here the second order bias correction, 
described for example in Ref.38. Summing up the entropies per site shown in Fig. 1, we 
can get an estimate for the information content by applying Eq. (15). The maximal 
entropy , when measured in mers, is of course 57, so the information content is just 
  
IRodentia = 57 − H(Xi
i=1
57
∑ | eRodentia )  , (16) 
which comes out to 
  
IRodentia = 25.29 ± 0.09 mers  ,   (17) 
where the error is obtained from the theoretical estimate of the variance given the 
frequency estimate38.  
 FIG. 2: Difference between entropic profile ∆Entropy of the homeobox protein of rodents and 
primates (the latter from 903 sequences in Pfam, accessed February 3rd, 2011). Error bars are the 
error of the mean of the difference, using the average of the number of sequences. The colored 
boxes indicate structural domains as determined for the fly version of this gene. (‘N’ refers to the 
protein’s “N-terminus”.) 
The same analysis can be repeated for the primate homeodomain protein. In Fig. 2, we 
can see the difference between the “entropic profile” of rodents and primates  
  ,      (18) 
which shows some significant differences, in particular, it seems, at the edges between 
structural motifs in the protein.  
When summing up the entropies to arrive at the total information content of the primate 
homeodomain protein we obtain 
 ,   (19) 
which is identical to the information content of rodent homeodomains within statistical 
error. We can thus conclude that while the information is encoded somewhat differently 
between the rodent and the primate version of this protein, the total information content is 
the same.  
3. Evolution of Information 
While the total information content of the homeodomain protein has not changed between 
rodents and primates, what about longer time intervals? If we take a protein that is 
ubiquitous among different forms of life (that is, its homologue is present in many 
different branches) has its information content changed as it is used in more and more 
complex forms? One line of argument tells us that if the function of the protein is the 
same throughout evolutionary history, then its information content should be the same in 
each variant. We saw a hint of that when comparing the information content of the 
homeodomain protein between rodents and primates. But we can also argue instead that 
because information is measured relative to the environment the protein (and thus, the 
organism) finds itself in, then organisms that live in very different environments can 
potentially have different information content even if the sequences encoding the proteins 
are homologous. Thus, we could expect differences in protein information content in 
organisms that are different enough that the protein is used in different ways. But it is 
certainly not clear whether we should observe a trend of increasing or decreasing 
information along the line of descent. In order to get a first glimpse at what these 
differences could be like, I will take a look here at the evolution of information in two 
proteins that are important in the function of most animals: the homeodomain protein and 
the COX2 (cytochrome-c-oxidase subunit 2) protein. 
The homeodomain (or homebox) protein is essential in determining the pattern of 
development in animals: it is crucial in directing the arrangement of cells according to a 
particular body plan39. In other words, the homeobox determines where the head goes and 
where the tail. Although it is often said that these proteins are specific to animals, some 
plants have homeodomain proteins that are homologous to those I study here40. The 
COX2 protein, on the other hand, is a subunit of a large protein complex with 13 
subunits41. While a non-functioning (or severely impaired) homeobox protein certainly 
leads to aborted development, an impaired COX complex has a much less drastic effect: 
it leads to mitochondrial myopathy due to a cytochrome oxidase deficiency42, but is 
usually not fatal43.  Thus, by testing the changes within these two proteins, we are 
examining proteins with very different selective pressures acting on them. 
To calculate the information content of each of these proteins along the evolutionary line 
of descent, in principle we need access to the sequences of extinct forms of life. Even 
though the resurrection of such extinct sequences is possible in principle44 using an 
approach dubbed “paleogenetics”45,46, we can take a shortcut by grouping sequences 
according to the depth that they occupy within the phylogenetic tree. So, when we 
measure the information content of the homeobox protein on the taxonomic level of the 
family, we include in there the sequences of homeobox proteins of chimpanzees, gorillas 
and orangutans along with humans. As the chimpanzee version, for example, is 
essentially identical with the human version, we do not expect to see any change in 
information content when moving from the species level to the genus level. But, we can 
expect that by grouping the sequences on the family level (rather than the genus or 
species level), we move closer towards evolutionarily more ancient proteins, in particular 
because this group is used to reconstruct the sequence of the ancestor of that group. The 
great apes are but one family of the order of “Primates”, which besides the apes also 
contains the families of monkeys, lemurs, lorises, tarsiers, and galagos. Looking at the 
homebox protein of all the primates then takes us further back in time. A simplified 
version of the phylogeny of animals is shown in Fig. 3, which shows the hierarchical 
organization of the tree. 
 FIG. 3: Simplified phylogenetic classification of animals. At the root of this tree (on the left tree) 
are the eukaryotes, but only the animal branch is shown here. If we follow the line of descent of 
humans, we move on the branch towards the vertebrates. The vertebrate clade itself is shown in 
the tree on the right, and the line of descent through this tree follows the branches that end in the 
mammals. The mammal tree, finally, is shown at the bottom, with the line ending in Homo 
sapiens indicated in red. 
The database Pfam uses a range of different taxonomic levels (anywhere from 12 to 22, 
depending on the branch) defined by the NCBI Taxonomy Project47, which we can take 
as a convenient proxy for taxonomic depth: ranging from the most basal taxonomic 
identifications (such as phylum) to the most specific ones. In Fig. 4, we can see the total 
sequence entropy  
  
Hk (X) = H(Xi | ek )
i=1
57
∑ , (20) 
for sequences with the NCBI taxonomic level k, as a function of the level depth. Note that 
sequences at level k always include all the sequences at level k-1. Thus, 
  
H1(X) , which is 
the entropy of all homeodomain sequences at level k =1, includes the sequences of all 
eukaryotes. Of course, the taxonomic level description is not a perfect proxy for time.  On 
the vertebrate line for example, the genus Homo occupies level k=14, whereas the genus 
Mus occupies level k=16. If we now plot 
  
Hk (X) versus k (for the major phylogenetic 
groups only), we see a curious splitting of the lines based only on total sequence entropy, 
and thus information (as information is just I=57-H if we measure entropy in mers). At 
the base of the tree, the metazoan sequences split into chordate proteins with a lower 
information content (higher entropy) and arthropod sequences with higher information 
content, possibly reflecting the different uses of the homeobox in these two groups. The 
chordate group itself splits into mammalian proteins and the fish homeodomain. There is 
even a notable split in information content into two major groups within the fishes. 
 
FIG. 4: Entropy of homeobox domain protein sequences (PF00046 in the Pfam database, 
accessed July 20th, 2006) as a function of taxonomic depth for different major groups that have at 
last 200 sequences in the database, connected by phylogenetic relationships. Selected groups are 
annotated by name. 57 core residues were used to calculate the molecular entropy. Core residues 
have at least 70% sequence in the database.  
The same analysis applied to subunit II of the COX protein (counting only 120 residue 
sites that have sufficient statistics in the database) gives a very different picture. Except 
for an obvious split of the bacterial version of the protein and the eukaryotic one, the total 
entropy markedly decreases across the lines as the taxonomic depth increases.  
Furthermore, the arthropod COX2 is more entropic than the vertebrate one (see Fig. 5) as 
opposed to the ordering for the homeobox protein. This finding suggests that the 
evolution of the protein information content is specific to each protein, and most likely 
reflects the adaptive value of the protein for each family.  
 FIG. 5: Entropy of COX subunit II (PF00116 in the Pfam database, accessed June 22nd, 2006) 
protein sequences as a function of taxonomic depth for selected different groups (at least 200 
sequences per group), connected by phylogenetic relationships. 120 core residues were used to 
calculate the molecular entropy.  	  
 
 
4. Evolution of information in robots and animats 
The evolution of information within the genes of adapting organisms is but one use of 
information theory in evolutionary biology. Just as anticipated in the heydays of the  
“Cybernetics” movement48, information theory has indeed something to say about the 
evolution of information-processing in animal brains. The general idea behind the 
connection between information and function is simple: because information (about a 
particular system) is what allows the bearer to make predictions (about that particular 
system) with accuracy better than chance, information is valuable as long as prediction is 
valuable. In an uncertain world, making accurate predictions is tantamount to survival. In 
other words, we expect that information, acquired from the environment and processed, 
has survival value and therefore is selected for in evolution.  
4.1. Predictive information  
The connection between information and fitness can be made much more precise. A key 
relation between information and its value for agents that survive in an uncertain world as 
a consequence of their actions in it was provided by Ay et al.49, who applied a measure 
called “predictive information” (defined earlier by Bialek et al.50 in the context of 
dynamical systems theory) to characterize the behavioral complexity of an autonomous 
robot. These authors showed that the mutual entropy between a changing world (as 
represented by changing states in an organism’s sensors) and the actions of motors that 
drive the agent’s behavior (thus changing the future perceived states) is equivalent to 
Bialek’s predictive information as long as the agent’s decisions are Markovian, that is, 
only depend on the state of the agent and the environment at the preceding time. This 
predictive information is defined as the shared entropy between motor variables 
  
Yt  and 
the sensor variables at the subsequent time point 
  
Xt+1 
  
Ipred = I(Yt : Xt+1) = H(Xt+1) − H(Xt+1 |Yt )   .       (21) 
Here,  is the entropy of the sensor states at time , defined as 
  
H(Xt+1) = − p(xt+1)log
xt+1
∑ p(xt+1)   ,  (22) 
using the probability distribution 
  
p(xt+1) over the sensor states 
  
xt+1  at time 
  
t +1. The 
conditional entropy 
  
H(Xt+1 |Yt )  characterizes how much is left uncertain about the future 
sensor states 
  
Xt+1 given the robot’s actions in the present, that is, the state of the motors 
at time t, and can be calculated in the standard manner20,21 from the joint probability 
distribution of present motor states and future sensor states 
  
p(xt+1 | yt ).  
As Eq. (21) implies, the predictive information measures how much of the entropy of 
sensorial states—that is, the uncertainty about what the detectors will record next—is 
explained by the motor states at the preceding time point. For example, if the motor states 
at time t perfectly predict what will appear in the sensors at time , then the predictive 
information is maximal. Another version of the predictive information studies not the 
effect the motors have on future sensor states, but the effect the sensors have on future 
motor states instead, for example in order to guide an autonomous robot through a 
maze51. In the former case, the predictive information quantifies how actions change the 
perceived world, while in the latter case the predictive information characterizes how the 
perceived world changes the robot’s actions. Both formulations, however, are equivalent 
when taking into account how world and robot states are being updated51. While it is 
clear that measures such as predictive information should increase as an agent or robot 
learns to behave appropriately in a complex world, it is not at all clear whether 
information could be used as an objective function that, if maximized, will lead to 
appropriate behavior of the robot. This is the basic hypothesis of Linsker’s “Infomax” 
principle52, which posits that neural control structures evolve to maximize “information 
preservation” subject to constraints. This hypothesis implies that the infomax principle 
could play the role of a guiding force in the organization of perceptual systems. This is 
precisely what has been observed in experiments with autonomous robots evolved to 
perform a variety of tasks. For example, in one task visual and tactile information had to 
be integrated in order to grab an object53, while in another groups of five robots were 
evolved to move in a coordinated fashion54 or else to navigate according to a map55. Such 
experiments suggest that there may be a deeper connection between information and 
fitness that goes beyond the regularities induced by a perception-action loop, that 
connects fitness (in the evolutionary sense as the growth rate of a population) directly to 
information.  
Indeed, Rivoire and Leibler18 recently studied abstract models of the population dynamics 
of evolving “finite-state agents” that optimize their response to a changing environment 
and found just such a relationship. In such a description, agents respond to a changing 
environment with a probability distribution  of changing from state  to 
state , in order to maximize the growth-rate of the population. Under fairly general 
assumptions, the growth rate is maximized if the Shannon information that the agents can 
extract from the changing environment is maximal18. For our purposes, this Shannon 
information is nothing but the predictive information discussed above (see 
Supplementary Text S1 in Ref.51 for a discussion of that point). However, such a simple 
relationship only holds if each agent perceives the environment in the same manner, and 
if information is acquired only from the environment. If information is inherited or 
retrieved from memory, on the other hand, predictive information cannot maximize 
fitness. This is easily seen if we consider an agent that makes decisions based on a 
combination of sensory input and memory. If memory states (instead of sensor states) 
best predict an agent’s actions, the correlation between sensors and motors may be lost 
even though the actions are appropriate. A typical case would be navigation under 
conditions when the sensors do not provide accurate information about the environment, 
but the agent has nevertheless learned the required actions “by heart”. In such a scenario, 
the predictive information would be low because the actions do not correlate with the 
sensors. Yet, the fitness is high because the actions were controlled by memory, not by 
the sensors. Rivoire and Leibler show further that if the actions of an agent are always 
optimal given the environment then a different measure maximizes fitness, namely the 
shared entropy between sensors and variables given the previous time step’s sensor 
statesb: 
          
  
Icausal = I(Xt :Yt+1 | Xt−1)   .    (23) 
In most realistic situations, however, optimal navigation strategies cannot be assumed. 
Indeed, as optimal strategies are (in a sense) the goal of evolutionary adaptation, such a 
measure could conceivably only apply at the endpoint of evolution. Thus, no general 
expression can be derived that ties these informational quantities directly to fitness.  
4.2. Integrated Information 
What are the aspects of information processing that distinguish complex brains from 
simple ones? Clearly, processing large amounts of information is important, but a large 
capacity is not necessarily a sign of high complexity. It has been argued that a hallmark 
of complex brain function is its ability to integrate disparate streams of information and 
mold them into a complex gestalt that represents more than the sum of its parts56-65. 
These streams of information come from different sensorial modalities such as vision, 
sound, and olfaction, but also (and importantly) memory, and create a conscious 
experience in our brains that allows us to function at levels not available to purely 
reactive brains. One way to measure how much information a network processes is to 
calculate the shared entropy between the nodes at time t and time t+1 
  
Itotal = I(Zt : Zt+1)   .  (24) 
Here,  represents the state of the entire network (not just the sensors or motors) at time 
t, and thus the total information captures information processing among all nodes of the 
network, and can in principle be larger or smaller than the predictive information that 
only considers processing between sensor and motors. 
We can write the network random variable  as a product of the random variables that 
describe each node i, that is, each neuron, as (n is the number of nodes in the network) 
    
  
Zt = Zt(1)Zt(2)Zt(n ) ,     (25) 
which allows us to calculate the amount of information processed by each individual 
node i as 
  
  
I(i) = I(Zt(i) : Zt+1(i) ) . (26) 
Note that I omitted the index t on the left-hand-side of Eqs. (24) and (26), assuming that 
the dynamics of the network becomes stationary as , and thus that a sampling of 
the network states at any subsequent time points becomes representative of the agent’s 
behavior. If the nodes in the network process information independently from each other, 
then the sum (over all neurons) of the information processed by each neuron would equal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
b The notation is slightly modified here to conform to the formalism used in Ref.51 
the amount of information processed by the entire network. The difference between the 
two then represents the amount of information that the network processes over and above 
the information processed by the individual neurons, the synergistic information51: 
  
SIatom = I(Zt : Zt+1) − I( i)(Zt( i) : Zt+1( i) )
i=1
n
∑  .   (27) 
The index “atom” on the synergistic information reminds us that the sum is over the 
indivisible elements of the network: the neurons themselves. As we shall see below, other 
more general partitions of the network are possible, and often times more appropriate to 
capture synergy. The synergistic information is related to other measures of synergy that 
have been introduced independently. One is simply called “integration” and defined in 
terms of Shannon entropies as64,66,67  
 
  
H(Zt(i)) − H(Zt )
i=1
n
∑   . (28) 
This measure has been introduced earlier under the name “multi-information”68,69.   
Another measure, called 
  
Φatom 	   in Ref.51, was independently introduced by Ay and 
Wennekers70,71 as a measure of the complexity of dynamical systems they called 
“stochastic interaction”, and is defined as 
  
Φatom = H(Zt(i) | Zt+1(i) ) − H(Zt | Zt+1)
i=1
n
∑ .   (29) 
Note the similarity between Eqs. (27-29): while (27) measures synergistic information, 
(28) measures “synergistic entropy” and (29) synergistic conditional entropy in turn. The 
three are related because entropy and information are related, as for example in Eqs. (11) 
and (21). Using this relation, it is easy to show that51 
  
Φatom = SIatom +   .   (30) 
While we can expect that measures such as (28-30) quantify some aspects of information 
integration, it is likely that they overestimate the integration because it is possible that 
elements of the computation are performed by groups of neurons that together behave as 
a single entity. In that case, subdividing the whole network into independent neurons may 
lead to the double-counting of integrated information. A cleaner (albeit computationally 
much more expensive) approach is to find a partition of the network into non-overlapping 
groups of nodes (parts) that are as independent of each other (information-theoretically 
speaking) as possible. If we define the partition P of a network into k parts via 
  
  
P = P(1),P(2),P(k ){ } , where each 
  
P(i) is a part of the network (an non-empty set of 
neurons with no overlap between the parts), then we can define a quantity that is 
analogous to Eq. (29) except that the sum is over the parts rather than the individual 
neurons61 
             
  
Φ(P) = H(Pt( i) |Pt+1( i) ) − H(Pt |Pt+1)
i=1
n
∑  .    (31)   
In Eq. (31), each part carries a time label because every part takes on different states as 
time proceeds. The so-called “Minimum Information Partition” (or MIP) is found by 
minimizing a normalized Eq. (31) over all partitions 
  
MIP =  arg min
P
Φ(Pt )
N(Pt )
  ,   (32) 
where the normalization 
  
N(Pt ) = (k −1)mini Hmax (Pt( i))[ ] balances the parts of the 
partition62. Using this MIP, the integrated information 
  
Φ  is then simply given by 
  
  
Φ = Φ(P = MIP)  .    (33) 
Lastly, we need to introduce one more concept in order to measure information 
integration in realistic evolving networks. Because the 
  
Φ  of a network with a single (or 
more) disconnected nodes vanishes (because the MIP for such a network is always the 
partition into the connected nodes in one part, and the disconnected in another) we should 
attempt to define the computational “main complex”, which is that subset of nodes for 
which 
  
Φ  is maximal62. This measure will be called 
  
ΦMC in the following.
 
FIG. 6 A: Three candidate measures of information integration 
  
Φatom  (29), 
  
ΦMC, and  (28) 
along the line of descent of a representative evolutionary run in which animats adapted to solve a 
two-dimensional maze. B: Three measures of information processing, in the same run. Blue: total 
information 
  
Itotal  (24), green: atomic information 
  
SIatom (27), and red: predictive information 
  
Ipred  
(21) (from Ref.51).  
While all these measures attempt to capture synergy, it is not clear whether any of them 
correlate with fitness when an agent evolves, that is, it is not clear whether synergy or 
integration capture an aspect of the functional complexity of control structures that goes 
beyond the predictive information defined earlier. To test this, Edlund et al. evolved 
animats that learned, over 50,000 generations of evolution, to navigate a two-dimensional 
maze51, constructed in such a way that optimal navigation requires memory. While 
measuring fitness, they also recorded six different candidate measures for brain 
complexity, among which the predictive information Eq. (21), the total information Eq. 
(24), the synergistic information Eq. (27), as well as the integration Eq. (28), the “atomic 
  
Φ” (29), as well as the computationally intensive measure 
  
ΦMC. Fig. 6 shows a 
representative run (of 64) that shows the six candidate measures as a function of 
evolutionary time measured in generations. During this run, the fitness increased steadily, 
with a big step around generation 15,000 where this particular animat evolved the 
capacity to use memory for navigation (from Ref.51).  
It is not clear from a single run which of these measures best correlates with fitness. If we 
take the fitness attained at the end of each of 64 runs and plot it against the fitness (here 
measured as the percentage of the achievable fitness in this environment), the 
sophisticated measure 
  
ΦMC emerges as the clear winner, with a Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient with achieved fitness of R=0.937 (see Fig. 7). This suggests that 
measures of information integration can go beyond simple “reactive” measures such as 
  
Ipred  in characterizing complex behavior, in particular when the task requires memory, as 
was the case there.  
FIG. 7: Correlation of information-based measures of complexity with fitness. 
  
ΦMC, , 
  
Φatom ,
  
Itotal ,
  
Ipred , and 
  
SIatom as a function of fitness at the end of each of 64 independent runs. R 
indicates Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. The red dot shows the run depicted in Fig. 6 
(from Ref.51).  
5. Future Directions 
Needless to say, there are many more uses for information theory in evolutionary biology 
than reviewed here. For example, it is possible to describe the evolution of drug 
resistance in terms of loss, and subsequent gain, of information: when a pathogen is 
treated with a drug, the fitness landscape of that pathogen is changed (often dramatically) 
and as a consequence the genomic sequence that represented information before the 
administration of the drug is not information (or much less information) about the new 
environment22. As the pathogen adapts to the new environment, it acquires information 
about that environment and its fitness increases commensurately.  
Generally speaking, it appears that there is a fundamental law that links information to 
fitness (suitably defined). Such a relationship can be written down explicitly for specific 
systems, such as the relationship between the information content of DNA binding sites 
with the affinity the binding proteins have with that site72, or the relationship between the 
information content of ribozymes and their catalytic activity73. We can expect such a 
relationship to hold as long as information is valuable, and this will always be the case as 
long as information can be used in decision processes (broadly speaking) that increase the 
long-term of success of a lineage. It is possible to imagine exceptions to such a law where 
information would be harmful to an organism, in the sense that signals perceived by a 
sensory apparatus overwhelm, rather than aid, an organism. Such a situation could arise 
when the signals are unanticipated, and simply cannot be acted upon in an appropriate 
manner (for example in animal development). It is conceivable that in such a case 
mechanisms will evolve that protect an organism from signals: this is the basic idea 
behind the evolution of canalization74, which is the capacity of an organism to maintain 
its phenotype in the face of genetic and environmental variation.  I would like to point 
out, however, that strictly speaking, canalization is the evolution of robustness with 
respect to entropy (noise), not information. If a particular signal cannot be used in order 
to make predictions, then this signal is not information. In that respect, even the evolution 
of canalization (if it increases organismal fitness) increases the amount of information an 
organism has about its environment, because insulating itself from certain forms of noise 
will increase the reliability of the signals that the organism can use to further its 
existence.  
An interesting example that illustrates the benefit of information and the cost of entropy 
is the evolution of cooperation, couched in the language of evolutionary game theory75. 
In evolutionary games, cooperation can evolve as long as the decision to cooperate 
benefits the group more than it costs the individual76-78. Groups can increase the benefit 
accruing to them if they can choose judiciously who to interact with. Thus, acquiring 
information about the game environment (in this case, the other players) increases the 
fitness of the group via mutual cooperative behavior.  Indeed, it was shown recently that 
cooperation can evolve among players that interact via the rules of the so-called 
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” game if the strategies that evolve can take into account 
information about how the opponent is playing79. However, if this information is marred 
by noise (either from genetic mutations that decouple the phenotype from the genotype or 
from other sources), the population will soon evolve to defect rather than to cooperate. 
This happens because when the signals cannot be relied upon anymore, information (as 
the noise increases) gradually turns into entropy. In that case, canalization is the better 
strategy, and players evolve genes that ignore the opponent’s moves79. Thus, it appears 
entirely possible that an information-theoretic formulation of inclusive fitness theory (a 
theory that predicts the fitness of groups76,77 that goes beyond Hamilton’s kin selection 
theory) will lead to a predictive framework in which reliable communication is the key to 
cooperation.   
6. Conclusions 
Information is the central currency for organismal fitness80, and appears to be that which 
increases when organisms adapt to their niche13. Information about the niche is stored in 
genes, and used to make predictions about the future states of the environment. Because 
fitness is higher in well-predicted environments (simply because it is easier to take 
advantage of the environment’s features for reproduction if they are predictable), 
organisms with more information about their niche are expected to outcompete those with 
less, suggesting a direct relationship between information content and fitness within a 
niche (comparisons of information content across niches, on the other hand, are 
meaningless because the information is not about the same system). A very similar 
relationship, also enforced by the rules of natural selection, can be found for information 
acquired not through the evolutionary process, but instead via an organism’s sensors. 
When this information is used for navigation, for example, then a measure called 
“predictive information” is a good proxy for fitness as long as navigation is performed 
taking only sensor states into account: indeed, appropriate behavior evolves when 
information, not fitness, is maximized. If instead decisions are also influenced by 
memory, different information-theoretic constructions based on the concept of 
“integrated information” appear to correlate better with fitness, and capture how the brain 
forms more abstract representations of the world81 that are used to predict the states of the 
world on temporal scales much larger than the immediate future.  Thus, the ability of 
making predictions about the world that range far into the future may be the ultimate 
measure of functional complexity82 and perhaps even intelligence83.  
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